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1 Introduction 
The aim of this report is to present the newest developments in the climate negotiations, 
particularly from part two of the sixth Conference of the Parties to the Climate Convention 
(COP6-2) in Bonn in July 2001, and to evaluate what the “Bonn agreement” means for 
business.1  
 
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in December 1997, but has not yet entered into force since 
not enough countries have ratified the Protocol. At the fourth Conference of the Parties in 
Buenos Aires in November 1998 the “Buenos Aires Plan of Action” was adopted, with the 
aim to develop a final regulatory framework for the Kyoto Protocol over the next two years. 
However, the sixth Conference of the Parties to the Climate Convention (COP6-1) in The 
Hague in November 2000 failed to reach consensus on the remaining issues. After the 
American rejection of the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001, the future for the Protocol seemed 
bleaker than ever before. Despite that many observers had low expectations for COP6-2 in 
Bonn in July 2001, a number of parties, particularly the EU, showed enough flexibility to 
make an accord, the so-called Bonn agreement, possible.2 After heavy negotiations during the 
last four days (and nights) of the conference, the agreement was adopted on 23 July.  
 
Still there is no guarantee that the Kyoto Protocol will enter into force. For it to do so, 
industrialized countries representing at least 55% of carbon dioxide emissions among this 
group of countries in 1990 would have to ratify the Protocol. Without American ratification 
this means that most other industrialized countries have to ratify. Due to their large share of 
1990 emissions, Russia and Japan are two pivotal countries in this context. The Bonn 
negotiations showed that Japan, Russia, Australia, and Canada might be the countries that are 
most reluctant to ratify. Much depends on the outcome of the next negotiation session at 
COP7 in Marrakech, Morocco, 29 October until 9 November 2001, where the plan is to adopt 
the final text required to make the Kyoto Protocol ratifiable. Some parties to the Protocol 
have expectations that it might enter into force by the new global summit “Rio plus ten” in 
South Africa in September 2002. This might be possible, but it is more likely that the Kyoto 
Protocol could enter into force by the end of 2002.   
 
In the next section of this report, a short analysis of the negotiation positions of major parties 
with regard to four important topics is presented, both in a static and dynamic perspective. 
Then the main contents of the Bonn agreement are presented, divided into the four main areas 
of the Kyoto mechanisms (i.e., Emissions Trading (ET), Joint Implementation (JI), and the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)), sinks (i.e. land-use, land-use change and forestry 
(LULUCF)), compliance under the Kyoto Protocol, and funding of climate measures in 
developing countries. Some emphasis is put on the Kyoto mechanisms since they are assumed 
to be of particular interest to business. The next section discusses the prospects for the Kyoto 
Protocol, and is followed by an analysis of the present and future position of the US. Finally, 
the last section explores the challenges of harmonizing different national and regional 
emissions trading initiatives, and trading under the Kyoto Protocol, particularly with respect 
to trading between the US and countries within “the Kyoto block.” 
1 The official name of the Climate Convention is United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). 
2 The Bonn agreement is presented in the document UNFCCC 2001. 
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2 Negotiation positions of major parties 
One of the challenges of the negotiations under the Buenos Aires plan of action has been to 
bridge the parties’ different views and positions on important components of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Slide 1 shows some major parties’ positions on sinks and supplementarity until 
early 2000 or July 2001 (COP6-2) (compare with the change in positions depicted in Slide 3). 
Along the horizontal axis, some parties favored soft rules on sinks (LULUCF) that would 
make it possible for many countries to account for sizeable volumes of carbon fixation in 
living or dead biomass stock as part of fulfilling their Kyoto target. Other parties, such as the 
EU, favored stricter rules, arguing that the science in the area is lacking at present, that there 
are many technical difficulties, and that soft rules would undermine the Kyoto targets and 
incentives to de-carbonize energy systems. Along the vertical axis, the parties’ position on the 
supplementarity clause of the Kyoto Protocol is shown, where the idea is to focus the parties’ 
attention on domestic actions to mitigate emissions.3 The so-called Umbrella group 
(Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Ukraine, and the USA) 
favored soft rules on supplementarity, which would imply no quantified ceiling on the use of 
the Kyoto mechanisms, whereas the EU and developing countries (G77/China) favored 
stricter rules. At the Buenos Aires conference, the EU proposed that “a concrete ceiling on the 
use of the flexibility mechanisms has to be defined in quantitative and qualitative terms….” 
Before COP5 in Bonn in 1999, the EU elaborated this proposal into a formula-based approach 
to define an absolute ceiling on using the Kyoto mechanisms, roughly equivalent to limiting 
purchase and sale of quotas to 50% of the required emissions reductions to meet the national 
Kyoto targets. 
 
Slide 1. Some parties’ position on sinks and supplementarity 
 
Some parties’ positions on 
sinks and supplementarity
Strict
Soft Strict
Sinks
Supplementarity
G77/China
USA, Canada, Japan, 
Russia, Australia Norway
EU
Source: CICERO
 
 
                                                     
3 Article 17 on emissions trading states that “Any such trading shall be supplemental to domestic 
actions ….” 
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Slide 2 presents a similar position map as Slide 1, but now with funding of climate measures 
in developing countries along the horizontal axis and compliance along the vertical axis. 
Japan, Russia and Australia have resisted a specified level for industrialized countries to 
transfer to the three funds under the Climate Convention and the Kyoto Protocol to support 
developing countries in coping with the challenges of climate change. In earlier proposals by 
the President of COP6, the Dutch minister of environment Jan Pronk, a figure of one billion 
USD annually was mentioned. On the other hand, developing countries, the EU and some 
other countries favored a specified funding level. In terms of compliance to the Kyoto 
Protocol, countries like the USA, the EU and Canada argued for a strict regime as an 
important underpinning of the environmental efficiency of the Kyoto Protocol and a solid 
basis for the Kyoto mechanisms. This position has been opposed by Japan in particular, but 
also by Russia and Australia, since these countries have argued for a softer compliance 
regime. Japan managed to have “legal” removed from the wording “To adopt, at its sixth 
session, a legal instrument on procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance as an 
integral part of the Kyoto Protocol.”, and to postpone the final decision on compliance to the 
first meeting of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol (MOP), which can first take place after the 
Protocol has entered into force.4  
 
Slide 2.  Some parties’ positions on compliance and funding 
 
Some parties’ positions on 
compliance and funding
Strict
Soft
Specified level
Funding of climate measures in 
developing countries
Compliance
G77/China
Japan, Russia, 
Australia
EU
Source: CICERO
Non-specified level
USA
Canada, Norway
 
 
4 The final wording is “To adopt, at its sixth session, the procedures and mechanisms relating to 
compliance as specified above; and recommend the adoption, by the Conference of the Parties serving 
as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, at its first session, of procedures and mechanisms 
relating to compliance in terms of Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol.” 
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Slide 3 presents the dynamics of the positions on the same issues as in Slide 1 and 2.2. We 
see that the positions were more or less fixed from the Kyoto conference in 1997 until the 
summer 2000, where parties prepared for COP6 in The Hague, in terms of supplementarity, 
and up to summer 2001 and COP6-2 in Bonn, where the EU and G77/China in particular had 
to give in on their strict positions on sinks and compliance to make an accord achievable in 
Bonn. The countries fighting for soft rules, particularly Australia, Canada, Japan, and Russia 
won this battle. Thus the end result was a weaker Kyoto Protocol than what many observers 
had anticipated after the Kyoto conference in the sense that there is a large opening for sinks, 
it’s more or less up to a country to decide if the requirement of supplementarity in the use of 
the Kyoto mechanisms is met, and that sanctions in the case of non-compliance seems to be 
relatively mild.  
  
Slide 3. Changing positions on sinks, compliance, and supplementarity, 1997-
2001 
 
Changing positions on sinks, compliance, 
and supplementarity, 1997-2001
Source: CICERO
1997, COP3 1998, COP4 1999, COP5 2000, COP6-1 2001, COP6-2
Strict
supplementarity
Soft 
supplementarity Umbrella group*
•Umbrella group: Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, 
Russia, and USA (plus a few more)
EU
Strict compliance
Soft compliance Australia, Japan, Russia
G77/China, Canada, EU, Norway, 
USA
Sinks, soft
Sinks, strict rules G77/China, EU, Norway
Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Russia, USA
 
 
 
3 The Bonn agreement 
 
The four main issue areas of the Bonn agreement are shown in Slide 4. 
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Slide 4. The Bonn agreement 
 
The Bonn agreement: Political compromise reached at 
COP6, part 2, in Bonn, 23 July 2001
Four main areas:
 Funding for developing countries
 Land-use, Land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)
 The Kyoto mechanisms: Emissions trading (ET), Joint 
Implementation (JI), and the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM)
 Compliance
Source: CICERO
 
 
 
3.1 The Kyoto mechanisms 
 
Slide 5 presents an overview of the Kyoto mechanisms and domestic emissions trading, 
featuring units, participants and some other aspects.5  
 
Slide 6 shows the main contents of the Bonn agreement with regard to the Kyoto 
mechanisms. As earlier noted the supplementarity requirement has softened compared to 
some earlier proposals. The wording is now “That the use of the mechanisms shall be 
supplemental to domestic action and domestic action shall thus constitute a significant 
element of the effort made by each Party included in Annex I to meet its quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3, paragraph 1.”6 
                                                     
5 For simplicity, all three Kyoto mechanisms are referred to as “quotas” as long as discrimination 
between them is not important in the context. 
6 Annex I comprises industrialized countries as defined by the UNFCCC. 
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Slide 5. Mechanisms for greenhouse gas emissions trading 
 
Mechanisms for greenhouse gas emissions trading
Mechanism Unit Participants Features
Domestic emissions 
trading
Quota Firms and other national 
agents
Link to 
international 
emissions trading 
International emissions 
trading
Quota
Assigned amount unit 
(AAU)
Annex B countries 
(industrialized countries); 
private agents?
Supplementarity
Joint Implementation Credit
Emission reduction unit 
(ERU)
Annex B countries 
(industrialized countries); 
private agents?
Supplementarity;
Monitoring and 
verification
Clean Development 
Mechanism
Credit
Certified emission 
reductions (CER)
Annex B countries 
(industrialized countries) 
and non-Annex B 
countries (developing 
countries)
Supplementarity;
Monitoring and 
verification;
Tax as share of 
proceeds
Source: CICERO
 
 
 
The only Kyoto mechanism with a fee is the CDM, where 2% of the certified emissions 
reductions issued for a CDM project activity go toward financing the Kyoto Protocol 
adaptation fund (see section 3.3). This means that 2% of the credits produced by a CDM 
project are sold in the market and the earnings transferred to the adaptation fund. 
 
With regard to both JI and CDM it is stated that Annex I parties are to refrain from using 
credits generated from nuclear facilities to meet their Kyoto commitments. There is some 
uncertainty with regard to the wording “are to refrain from using” and if this should be 
interpreted as “must not use,” so the final legal text and its interpretation should be 
scrutinized. 
 
The Bonn agreement states that it is the host party’s prerogative to confirm whether a CDM 
project assists in achieving sustainable development. Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol outlines 
that the CDM has the dual objective of both helping Annex I parties meet their commitments 
and assisting the host developing country in achieving sustainable development. Allowing the 
host country to ascertain the sustainability of potential CDM projects is a simplified approach 
that probably saves transaction costs, but may create uncertainty about the sustainability 
effects of CDM projects. The host country’s evaluation would depend on the priority given to 
sustainability compared to benefits in terms of e.g. technology transfer through CDM 
projects. In the absence of clear and standardized criteria for sustainability, a CDM project 
that is acceptable in one host country may not be acceptable in another host country. 
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Slide 6. The Bonn agreement: The Kyoto mechanisms 
 
The Bonn agreement: The Kyoto mechanisms
• No specified ceiling on trade (”domestic action shall thus constitute a 
significant element of ...”)
• A 2% fee on the CDM mechanism (transferred to the adaptation fund)
• Refrain from nuclear power
• Host party to confirm whether a JI or CDM project contributes to 
sustainable development
• Fast-track for small-scale CDM projects
• Fungibility between the mechanisms 
• Emissions trading: Commitment period reserve
Source: CICERO
 
 
 
The Bonn agreement establishes a fast-track procedure for small-scale CDM projects whereby 
renewable energy projects with maximum output capacity less than 15 megawatts, energy 
efficiency improvement projects that reduce energy consumption by up to 15 gigawatt hours 
per year, and other project activities that reduce anthropogenic emissions by less than 15 
kilotonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents annually can benefit from simplified modalities and 
procedures. 
 
Fungibility between the Kyoto mechanisms refers to the degree to which quotas and credits 
generated through them can be interchanged at the global market, and thus function as one 
commodity in one market. If there are three segregated markets for the mechanisms, the 
fungibility is low. The Bonn agreement states that all three mechanisms can be employed to 
meet a party’s Kyoto commitments, thus supporting high fungibility at that level. However, 
due to some differences in the rules of the mechanisms – for instance with regard to who can 
participate, different constraints on the use of the mechanisms, and the fee placed only on the 
CDM – there is going to be less than full fungibility between the mechanisms. 
 
With the aim of preventing parties from overselling their quotas and thus making compliance 
to their Kyoto target later impossible, a commitment period reserve rule is included in the 
Bonn agreement. Slide 7 explains the main features of this rule. 
 
At all times during the budget period 2008 – 12, a country should keep a reserve equal to 90% 
of its Kyoto target in the national registry. Thus the net sum of all transfers must be less than 
10%. If a country in its most recent verified national report has emissions lower than 90% of 
its Kyoto target, this country would be allowed to transfer quotas equal to the difference 
between reported emissions and the Kyoto target. The 90% rule could pose a challenge for 
some countries that risk that large companies wish to transfer a sizeable share of their quotas 
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to other countries, which could compromise the commitment reserve rule. In designing a 
national emissions trading scheme, it is expected that the authorities will build in features that 
reduce the possibility of such occurrences. 
 
Slide 7. Emissions trading: Commitment period reserve 
 
Emissions trading: Commitment period reserve
• A country shall keep a reserve equal to 90% of its Kyoto target in its national 
registry
• This means that transfer of quotas to registries in other countries should at all times 
through the budget period 2008-12 be less than 10% of the Kyoto target of a country
• Alternatively, a country can transfer to other countries up to five times (due to the 
five-year budget period) the difference between its annual emissions according to the 
newest verified national report and its Kyoto target (provided the reported and 
verified emissions are lower than 90% of the Kyoto target)
• The motivation is to prevent nations from overselling their quotas and thus making 
compliance to their Kyoto targets later impossible
• If large companies for some reason want to transfer a large share of their quotas to 
registries in other countries, this could be in conflict with the reserve requirement of 
a country
• The national quota system must be designed to fulfill the requirement of a 
commitment period reserve 
Source: CICERO
 
 
 
3.2 Sinks 
 
Slide 8 shows the main contents of the Bonn agreement with regard to sinks (i.e., land-use, 
land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)). 
 
A party must demonstrate that the activities have occurred since 1990 and are human-
induced. The accounting is net-net, which means that net emissions or removals over the 
commitment period less net removals in the base year, times five, should be accounted for. A 
ceiling on eligible forest management activities for each industrialized country is specified in 
Annex Z to the Bonn agreement. The figure is 0.00 Mt Carbon per year for Australia, 12.00 
Mt Carbon for Canada, 0.88 Mt Carbon for France, 1.24 Mt Carbon for Germany, 13.00 Mt 
Carbon for Japan, 17.63 Mt Carbon for Russia, and 1.11 Mt Carbon for Ukraine. In addition 
there is a constraint on sink activities under the CDM, which are limited to 1% of base year 
emissions, times five, due to the commitment period length of five years (2008-12). 
Furthermore sink activities under the CDM are limited to afforestation or reforestation 
projects. These accounting rules apply to the first budget period 2008-12, and may thus 
change later. 
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Slide 8. The Bonn agreement: Sinks 
 
The Bonn agreement: Sinks
Land-use, Land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)
• Forest, cropland and grazing land management, and revegetation are 
eligible activities
• Net-net accounting
• A specified ceiling on forest management activities (Appendix Z)
• LULUCF activities under the CDM mechanism limited to 1% of 
1990 emissions, times five (due to the 5-year commitment period
2008-12) 
• Future reversal of any removal must be accounted for at the 
appropriate point in time
• Technologies relating to fossil fuels that capture and store 
greenhouse gases mentioned
Source: CICERO
 
 
 
Another sink option, technologies relating to fossil fuels that capture and store greenhouse 
gases, are mentioned under Article 3.14 of the Protocol, which deals with potential adverse 
social, environmental, and economic impacts on developing countries from climate policy 
measures undertaken in industrialized countries. 
 
3.3 Funding 
 
Slide 9 shows the decisions on funding of climate policy measures in developing countries. 
 
Altogether three funds under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are established. The aim 
of the Special Climate Change Fund is to finance activities, programs and measures related to 
climate change in the areas of adaptation, technology transfer, resource management, and to 
assist developing countries highly dependent on fossil fuel production in diversifying their 
economies. The aim of the Least Developed Countries Fund is to support a work program for 
this group of countries, including National Adaptation Programs of Action. The aim of the 
Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund is to finance concrete adaptation projects and programs in 
developing country parties to the Protocol. No specific amount to be transferred to these funds 
is mentioned, apart from the 2% fee on the CDM to the adaptation fund. The group of 
countries shown in the last bullet point of Slide 10 made a joint statement at the same time as 
the Bonn agreement was announced that they will transfer USD 410 million annually to these 
funds by 2005. It seems that this promise, even if it is outside of the Kyoto Protocol, was 
required to have the developing countries accept the political compromise of the Bonn 
agreement. 
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Slide 9. The Bonn agreement: Funding 
 
The Bonn agreement: Funding
• Special Climate Change Fund and a Least-developed Countries Fund 
under the UNFCCC
• The Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund
• Amount not specified
• The EU, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland to
contribute USD 410 million annually to these funds by 2005
Source: CICERO
 
 
3.4  Compliance 
 
Slide 10 lists the main contents of the accord on compliance to the Kyoto Protocol. The 
facilitative branch and the enforcement branch of the Compliance Committee each consists of 
one member from each of the five regional groups of the United Nations, one member from 
the small island developing countries, two members from industrialized countries, and two 
members from developing countries. The enforcement branch is responsible for determining 
whether a country (included in Annex I) is in compliance with its Kyoto target, 
methodological and reporting requirements, and eligibility requirements under the Kyoto 
mechanisms. Decisions by the Compliance Committee are taken by consensus. If consensus 
fails, a majority of at least three quarters is required. An additional requirement in the 
enforcement branch is a majority both among industrialized country members and developing 
country members. A country can appeal to the MOP related to meeting its Kyoto target if “it 
has been denied due process” by the enforcement branch. 
 
In case of non-compliance, the key concept is the requirement to restore non-compliance to 
ensure the environmental integrity. If the greenhouse gas emissions of a country are 10 Mt 
Carbon above the Kyoto target in the period 2008-12, this country has to cover its deficit plus 
30% in the next budget period (for instance 2013-17), totalling 13 Mt carbon in addition to its 
target for the new commitment period. Furthermore the country cannot participate in 
emissions trading until compliance is restored. 
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Slide 10. The Bonn agreement: Compliance 
 
The Bonn agreement: Compliance
• Establishment of a Compliance Committee with a facilitative branch and 
an enforcement branch
• Restoration of non-compliance plus 30% deduction rate in the next budget 
period
• Suspension of eligibility to emissions trading until compliance restored
• Adoption of rules postponed until first Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the 
Kyoto Protocol
Source: CICERO
 
 
 
4 The future of the climate policy regime 
4.1 Prospects for the Kyoto Protocol 
 
Slide 11 notes that there are important issues and details of the rules regarding the Kyoto 
mechanisms, sinks, and the compliance system still to be dealt with at the Marrakech 
conference this autumn. The funding issue seems to be settled, but one should keep in mind 
that most parties view this as a package deal and are therefore not willing to accept a deal on 
one of the components until all the parties can adopt the complete package of all components 
of the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
The fate of the Kyoto Protocol also depends on the final willingness of countries such as 
Russia, Japan, Australia, and Canada to ratify the Protocol. Since the USA (which is 
responsible for 36.1% of carbon dioxide emissions among industrialized countries in 1990) 
has rejected ratification, most of these countries must ratify for the Protocol to enter into 
force. Russian ratification is required under all circumstances (Russia is responsible for 
17.4% of the emissions), whereas Japanese ratification (Japan is responsible for 8.5% of the 
emissions) is not required if (almost) all other industrialized countries ratify. The entry into 
force threshold is that countries representing at least 55% of 1990 carbon dioxide emissions 
among industrialized countries must ratify the Protocol, thus the USA plus countries 
representing more than 8.9% of these emissions can block the Protocol. In the best case, 
enough countries could ratify the Protocol to make it enter into force late in 2002. 
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One aspect of a softer compliance system as part of the Kyoto Protocol is a weaker 
foundation for the Kyoto mechanisms and thus greater uncertainty with regard to future 
demand for quotas and consequently quota prices. 
 
  
Slide 11. Prospects for the Kyoto Protocol 
 
Prospects for the Kyoto Protocol
• Most remaining issues to be settled at COP7 in Marrakesh, Morocco, 29 
October – 9 November 2001:
 mechanisms (e.g. the role of private entities in emissions trading and the 
CDM)
 rules for sinks
 legally binding compliance system? (final rules postponed till the first MOP)
• Will Russia, Japan, Australia and Canada ratify the protocol?
• In the best case the protocol could enter into force late next year (the World 
summit ‘Rio plus 10’ takes place in South Africa in September 2002)
• The parties are to show demonstrable progress in meeting the protocol 
commitments by 2005; and they must engage in negotiations on targets for 
new budget periods by the same year
• Increased uncertainty regarding future quota prices because of softer 
compliance rules (than earlier proposed)
Source: CICERO
 
 
4.2 The United States’ position 
 
Slide 12 presents some points on the American position and likely consequences for the 
climate regime. A number of analyses show that US withdrawal will reduce quota prices on 
the global market due to the large potential quota demand of the United States. This will 
benefit buyers of quotas, but will also give weaker incentives for domestic climate measures 
and the development of new efficient, green technologies within countries that have ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol. Under all circumstances the USA is likely to develop its own climate 
strategy and be interested in establishing a domestic emissions trading system. There are good 
reasons to believe that the USA will allow American companies to meet, at least in part, their 
domestically fixed emissions reduction or limitation targets through participation in the Kyoto 
mechanisms. The authorities are interested in maintaining and developing US relations with 
important regions and countries such as the EU, Russia and China for economic, strategic and 
political reasons, apart from collaboration in the area of climate politics. Furthermore, such a 
policy might facilitate a later entry into the Kyoto Protocol regime. A high future flexibility in 
this area should be beneficial whatever the present climate policy looks like. American 
companies would be keen to participate in the global markets to gain experience, and also 
with a view to possible future re-entry by the USA. In addition, the companies could save 
expenses if the quota price is lower on the international market. Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
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could favor the participation of American companies in the Kyoto mechanisms since this 
might increase the chance of later US entry into the Protocol. The USA may choose to follow 
the definitions and rules of the Kyoto mechanisms or develop their own variants, which will 
have consequences for transaction costs, see section 5. 
 
 
Slide 12. The United States’ position 
The position of the United States
• The US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol reduces quota demand and 
thereby reduces the quota price
• The United States will develop a national climate policy strategy
• The United States may ratify the protocol later, and thus might participate 
in the second budget period (2013-17)
• The United States is likely to develop its own emission trading system
• American companies could be allowed to trade quotas with parties to the 
protocol as part of meeting targets defined under a national climate strategy
• The USA can choose quotas similar to the Kyoto mechanisms, or their own 
variants (ET-US, JI-US, CDM-US)
•The USA would be interested in quota trade with EU, China, Russia, and 
other countries for both economic, strategic and political reasons
Source: CICERO
 
 
 
5 Harmonizing quota trading systems 
 
Slide 13 depicts the main trading blocks in the global greenhouse gas quota market. The 
“Kyoto block” is divided into three parts: the OECD (Annex II); economies in transition to a 
market economy (EITs, countries that are a member of Annex I but not Annex II); and 
developing countries (G77/China; non-Annex I parties). The slide shows how the various 
Kyoto mechanisms can be applied by a block for trading quotas with other blocks. If trading 
between the Kyoto block and the USA is allowed, this can take place through the Kyoto 
mechanisms (ET, JI and CDM) or through American versions (US-ET, US-JI, or US-CDM). 
In the figure it is assumed that American companies situated in the USA can only buy quotas, 
and are thus not able to sell quotas on the global market due to the fact that the national target 
for the USA, however that is specified, is not part of the Kyoto Protocol. However, there is a 
possibility that American firms are allowed to sell JI credits on the global market since these 
are project-based. Branches of American companies situated within the Kyoto block, for 
instance in Europe, are allowed to participate fully in the Kyoto mechanisms. 
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Slide 13. Quota trading blocks 
Quota trading blocks
OECD
Economies in 
transition
The USA
American firms
situated in the 
USA
G77/China
ET, JI
Source: CICERO
CDM
CDM
ET, JI or
US-ET, US-JI
ET, JI or
US-ET, US-JI CDM or US-
CDM
The Kyoto block
 
 
 
Slide 14 presents some noteworthy points for the design of emissions trading systems to 
reduce transaction costs.  
 
 
Slide 14. Harmonizing quota trading systems 
Harmonizing quota trading systems
• There are initiatives to launch quota trading systems by 2008 or earlier in the 
EU and a number of other countries, including Australia, Denmark, Canada, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
• A number of features of the national and regional initiatives differ from one 
another
• The features of an American quota trading system are still uncertain
• Harmonization of trading rules is required to reduce transaction costs between 
countries both before 2008 (e.g. linking national systems with the EU trading 
scheme) and after 2008 (connecting national systems to the Kyoto Protocol 
system)
• Transaction costs are lowest when all quotas can be regarded as one 
commodity, and there is no need for risk adjustments of the price according to 
origin (i.e. seller liability)
• Transaction costs are lower the higher the level of fungibility between 
emissions trading, the CDM, and Joint Implementation
Source: CICERO
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There are a number of emissions trading systems initiatives with differing features, but this 
should not give rise to significantly higher transaction costs as long as the essential features 
are the same (see Slide 14). The simplest solution in this regard is to establish the finalized 
rules for the Kyoto mechanisms as the standard in all systems, also for a domestic system in 
the USA. Transaction costs are lowest when all quotas can be regarded as one commodity, 
even if such an ideal situation is not even likely for the Kyoto mechanisms alone. 
 
Slide 15 shows quota system features that are important to harmonize different quota trading 
systems on the background of a number of different initiatives in single countries and the EU 
to establish domestic systems before the first Kyoto target year 2008.  
 
 
Slide 15. Important features for harmonization of quota trading systems to 
reduce transaction costs 
Important features for harmonization of quota 
trading systems to reduce transaction costs
Source: CICERO
Sanctions on non-compliance
Quota allocation principles


Important for 
harmonization
Strict reporting and verification 
rules
Participation by private and 
public entities
Sector and greenhouse gas 
coverage
Quota definition and 
measurement
Less important for 
harmonization - national 
authorities may choose 
different solutions
Quota system
features
 
 
Furthermore, harmonization of quota system features is important to minimize transaction 
costs in the case of trading between the USA and the Kyoto block. Thus the table presented 
indicates what features the USA might want to build into their domestic system to facilitate 
participation in the Kyoto mechanisms. The slide shows that the critical features for 
harmonization of quota trading systems are quota definition and measurement, strict reporting 
and verification rules, and sanctions on non-compliance. Features like sector and greenhouse 
gas coverage, what legal entities are allowed to participate, and quota allocation system are of 
less importance. Note that the Kyoto target implementation cost of a country depends not only 
on low transaction costs. Implementation costs are reduced if there is the widest possible 
coverage of sectors, private and public entities, and greenhouse gases included in the Kyoto 
Protocol. Thus points four and five in the table are important from an implementation cost 
perspective. 
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